

## Conclusions

From the end of the Cold War, American security experts sought to create a new strategy that would replace containment; however, it wasn't until the 9/11 attacks that Washington found a new adversary against which to direct its foreign policy and with it the opportunity to create a grand strategy to combat this new foe: Terrorism. From the beginning, it was clear that the United States intended to act unilaterally if it was necessary to "defend" its interests, but even so a certain degree of legitimization was desirable both at home and abroad. Thus, America began the reckoning of its allies and enemies: those who were with them, and those who weren't.

For Canada, this was the beginning of a series of stumbles and achievements in their bilateral defence relationship with the US. Particularly, Canada's economic interests became greatly affected after the US decided to close its borders while they revisited their security policies. Their approach to dealing with border security was, therefore, by no means questionable, and measures were undertaken right away to comply with US exigencies in terms of border security in order to keep the flow of goods and services running. However, cooperation in border security was not enough for the US.

A period of general somnolence in bilateral relations came to an abrupt end with the 9/11 attack and immediate actions by the US to close its borders. The impact on Canada was profound as was (and is) the longer-term threat. Under the lead of Deputy Prime Minister John Manley and his counterpart, Homeland Security Director Tom Ridge, the governments quickly scrambled to put in place Smart Border measures, intended primarily to ensure greater security while at the same time facilitating relatively efficient movement of goods and people across our shared border. However, Canada's open opposition to the Iraq war and some intemperate remarks by government officials undermined this effort and added new strain to the relationship.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Burney, "The Perennial Challenge," p. 57

Since economic security is much more significant for Canada than it is to the United States, it is clear that it corresponds to Canadian policy makers the responsibility to find the means necessary to influence the way in which the US Department of Homeland Security operates and proceeds in terms of developing contingency plans that might affect Canada directly or indirectly. “The key challenge for Canada will be to prevent Washington from relying exclusively on a set of patterned, unilateral responses after each attack that are likely to run counter to [Canadian] interests. In order to acquire at least some indirect input into Washington’s post-attack crisis management techniques, Ottawa will become increasingly dependent on policies that make our commitment to American security crystal clear and unambiguous.”<sup>2</sup>

However, it is important to note that Ottawa’s challenges are not only placed abroad. Canadian public opinion has traditionally been more involved in foreign policy than in the US, and Canadians have expressed throughout the years an explicit need to differentiate themselves from Americans. There is also an expressed “Canadian identity” closely related to Canada’s image overseas, and many believe that “a strategic vision for Canada’s role in the world can serve as a reference point for Canadian citizens as they engage in their own day-to-day lives—lives which in so many cases involve a significant global component.”<sup>3</sup> Traditionally, Ottawa has placed a great importance on Canada’s image in the international arena in order to create and consolidate a Canadian identity in a country where Anglo-Saxons and Francophones have little else in common, not to mention the multiplicity of immigrants from all other cultures.

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<sup>2</sup> Harvey, Canada and the New American Empire, p 5

<sup>3</sup> Welsh, “Reality and Canadian Foreign Policy,” p. 28

For Canadians foreign policy is more than a debate between interests and values: it is a matter of “who we are,” a matter of identity; “ [f]or many decades, the notion of “middle power” served as the shorthand for [Canadians] global role and potential.”<sup>4</sup> Canadians were proud to be Canadians because it entailed being a liberal democracy, being involved in the promotion of global prosperity and security throughout the world, and being a North American country, but most importantly, it was all about the role Canada plays in the international arena distinctively from that played by the United States:

There are definitely streaks of anti-Americanism—latent and blatant—in Canada reflecting the wariness, the discomfort and the distaste of living along side the one and only global superpower. These sentiments are stimulated not just by what Americans and their governments do but by the pervasive influence of America in the life of most Canadians...It is not surprising, therefore, that Canadians see difference or distinction as an end in itself. Nor is it surprising that Canadian governments of all stripes strive rhetorically and sometimes quixotically, if not realistically, for a role in the world dissimilar to that of the United States.<sup>5</sup>

Nevertheless, if Washington had overlooked Canadian attitudes towards America before—particularly during the 1990s when Canada’s human security agenda confronted them to the US in international forums—after the 9/11 attacks this “benevolent” attitude towards its northern neighbor was bound to change. George Bush’s Administration has placed itself in a position where the War on Terrorism and a foreign policy based on a security agenda no longer permit them to be tolerant to defying attitudes from its alleged allies.

After 9/11 the American government is “is unlikely to be as patient with traditional Canadian schizophrenia in respect to foreign policy rhetoric and conduct as it

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<sup>4</sup> Ibid, p. 39

<sup>5</sup> Burney, “The Perennial Challenge,” p. 48

was in the immediate post-Cold War era. Although collaborating with the US in overseas military operations and seeking interoperability with American forces, Ottawa also seemed to go out of its way to adopt non-American policies, such as those on land mines and the International Criminal Court, in order to cut a distinct international figure abroad and especially at home by ‘pulling the eagle’s feathers.’”<sup>6</sup> For Jockel, as well as for Washington and some Canadian policymakers, Canada “needs to recall what being a good ally meant during the Cold War” and acknowledge that Americans view “homeland security and collaboration with Canada, as inseparable from what is necessarily a *global* war on terrorism.”

Due to geography and economic ties, practically all features of Canadian public policy are influenced by the bilateral relationship with the US, and when Canadians carry on as if the United States were unimportant there is an important price to be paid.<sup>7</sup> Several Canadian think tanks, most notably the Canadian Council of Chief Executives (CCCE) and Wendy Dobson of the C.D. Howe Institute, argue that Canada’s economic survival depends upon its access to the U.S. market and have thus proposed several strategies to deepen North American continental security.<sup>8</sup>

Canada, for its part, not only has signed a 30 point Secure Border Agreement with the US to ensure a higher security level and to facilitate the legitimate flow of goods and people, as well as to secure infrastructure and information sharing and coordination. Specific security measures were taken in the form of biometric identifiers, the NEXUS program, Pre-clearance, APIS, and integration of equipment and personnel in

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<sup>6</sup> Jockel, “A New Continental Consensus?,” p. 76

<sup>7</sup> Burney, “The Perennial Challenge,” p. 51

<sup>8</sup> David Bashow, citado en Walter Dorn, Human Security: An Overview  
URL: [http://www.rmc.ca/academic/gradrech/dorn24\\_e.html](http://www.rmc.ca/academic/gradrech/dorn24_e.html)

immigration issues.<sup>9</sup> It has also established a Ministry for Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, which closely resembles the Homeland Security Agency and its functions, and has enacted its own anti-terrorism legislation on Bill C-36.

Yet, border security and anti-terrorism legislation are not enough to appease Washington's demands of a greater involvement in their "coalition" against world terrorism. The problem for Canada is that US foreign policy and security agenda are deeply rooted in political realism and thus place special emphasis on interests whereas Canada has opted for a values-oriented foreign policy.

This split image between values and interests is reinforced when the debate is extended to take into account a second contentious policy question: should Canada complement or distinguish itself from the US in the external domain, and by what means? The Martin government has maintained an ambiguous attitude about its connections with the US. On the one hand it has recognized that well-managed relations with its close and predominant neighbor are salient to the management of a number of trade irritants that have refused to disappear, as well as for the entrenched realities of the post-9/11 security agenda. On the other hand, and at odds with the logic of its geographic setting and web of complex interdependence, it seems to retain serious reservations about becoming too isolated on a continental basis. Entrapment is feared as much as estrangement.[...]This ambiguity has accentuated the security and defence debate with reference to with whom and with what assets Canada should position itself.<sup>10</sup>

Entrapment and estrangement are both equally dangerous to Canada since it has not been playing the role it once did in the international arena. Even if multilateralism and their human security agenda are still their banner, their role as a peacekeeper has begun to show deficiencies, from a lack of physical and military resources, to a reduction in their

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<sup>9</sup> The White House, Securing America's Borders Fact Sheet: Border Security, Available On-line: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/pint/20020125.html>

<sup>10</sup> Cooper and Rowlands, "A State of Disconnects," p. 8

diplomatic influence.<sup>11</sup> It is important to assess that the Canadian human security agenda and peace missions not only relate to humanitarian desires:

For Canadians, the crisis of state order is not a distant issue. Our concern for it is not simply humanitarian. It has direct impact on our interests. Three of our most important recent immigration streams—from Somalia, Sri Lanka and Haiti—have come from failed or failing states. While we must always maintain our commitments to provide asylum for refugees, and while it is in our interest to maintain comparatively high levels of immigration, it is not obvious how any rich and favored country like Canada can expect to maintain effective immigration control and population management if we find ourselves living in a global order where state order is collapsing in twenty five to thirty states around the world.<sup>12</sup>

Whether for economic interests, because it affects their immigration agenda, or just because as a middle power Canada needs an active foreign policy that helps place it in a preeminent position within the international system, Canada will continue to exploit peace keeping in order to promote both its foreign policy objectives and interests as well as those related to domestic policy.

Another explanation of Canada's foreign policy is that for Ottawa, even if focusing on the US could have made sense during the Cold War and the period of the New World Order, new threats to international peace and security—and to the prosperity and safety of Canadians—make it necessary for Canada to collaborate with other actors, to contribute with the reform of institutions and to the construction of new international rules to deal with global issues.

When it comes to answering to international conflict, Canada has never and will never act alone, because it hasn't been part of the foreign policy tradition and because

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<sup>11</sup> Welsh, "Reality and Canadian Foreign Policy," p. 25

<sup>12</sup> Michael Ignatieff, "Peace, Order and Good Government: A Foreign Policy Agenda for Canada" (The Human Security Bulletin, (April 2004))

URL:[http://www.humansecuritybulletin.info/April\\_2004/Editorial/en/Ignatieff.php](http://www.humansecuritybulletin.info/April_2004/Editorial/en/Ignatieff.php)

they do not have the military capacity to do it. Therefore, Ottawa has the need to keep forces that can operate next to those of its allies in order to respond to humanitarian and other kinds of disasters.<sup>13</sup> Canada, as a middle power, has the need for other countries to contribute and participate economically and politically, and in so doing, there exists a possibility that US power can be balanced.

Balancing can involve the utilization of tools to make a superior state's military forces harder to use without directly confronting that state's power with one's own forces. Although soft balancing relies on nonmilitary tools, it aims to have a real, in indirect, effect on the military prospects of a superior state. Mechanisms of soft balancing include territorial denial, entangling diplomacy, economic strengthening, and signaling of resolve to participate in a balancing coalition.<sup>14</sup>

Soft balancing became an appealing strategy during the post-Cold War era “to challenge the legitimacy of the interventionist policies of the United States and its allies both internationally and in U.S. domestic public opinion. There is an international consensus that foreign intervention, even for humanitarian purposes, needs the ‘collective legitimation’ of the United Nations or a multilateral regional institution.”<sup>15</sup> For instance, world wide protests against the war might have made countries to deter from supporting more the US than they did when it came to the Operation Iraqi Freedom.

However true that might be, “[in] any re-evaluation of Canada’s role in the world, the country’s relationship with the United States will continue to loom large. The prominence of Canada-US relations stems not only from the undeniable facts of

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<sup>13</sup> Rigby, “The Canadian Forces and Human Security,” p. 55

<sup>14</sup> Robert A. Pape, “Soft Balancing Against the United States” (in International Security (Summer 2005, Vol 30 No 1)) p. 36

<sup>15</sup> T.V. Paul, “Soft Balancing in the Age of U.S. Primacy” (in International Security (Summer 2005, Vol 30 No 1)) p. 59

economic interdependence, but also from the central role which Washington occupies in many of the international institutions that matter to Canada: the United Nations, NATO, the WTO, and the G8.”<sup>16</sup> To manage relations with the US, the persistent challenge for Canadian policymakers is to find the right balance between the levels of trust and engagement respectively needed to ensure Canada’s economic and security interests.<sup>17</sup>

[B]ut Canadians cannot expect that dispatching forces to collaborate with the US overseas will yield influence in Washington. Even with the proposed increases in spending, Ottawa should be under no illusions about being able to significantly influence American decisions.<sup>18</sup>

Canadian policymakers must also bear in mind that leaders require the support of public opinion to make controversial policy decisions, and a divided public opinion cannot provide that support.<sup>19</sup> Therefore, it will be necessary that they find a way to address US security concerns without turning Canadian public opinion against themselves. As was stated in the report “In the National Interest: Canadian Foreign Policy in an Insecure World” prepared for the CDFAI (Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute) “it is also of vital importance for Canadians to understand that the only real imperative in Canadian foreign policy is Canada’s relationship with the US. All other Canadian international interests are far behind the importance of maintaining friendly and workable relations with the Americans.”<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> Welsh, “Reality and Canadian Foreign Policy,” p. 24-25

<sup>17</sup> Burney, “The Perennial Challenge,” p. 47

<sup>18</sup> Jockel, “A New Continental Consensus?,” p. 71

<sup>19</sup> Cambone, *A New Structure for National Security*, p. 4

<sup>20</sup> Denis Stairs et al, *In the National Interest: Canadian Foreign Policy in an Insecure World*, (Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, 2005 ) p. viii URL <http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/In%20The%20National%20Interest%20English.pdf>

If a way is found to meld interests with values and vice versa, it would be easier for Canadian policymakers to convince the Canadian public that pursuing Canada's economic interests and ties with the United States will not discredit them in the international arena. Canada has relied on the image that it has built while events have changed rules and actors in the international stage for too long, but now the international environment requires that, for the immediate future, Canada must decide what its alternatives in foreign policy are without forgetting that the United States is a central player for Canadian policymaking whether they like it or not.